> Posted by Michelle Romeu
Beth Rhyne’s latest Huffington Blog post brings a fresh perspective to the crisis unfolding in Andhra Pradesh. In looking at who is to blame, she discusses the supporting role played by policymakers. She also examines how, as a result of India’s history and politics, current policies aimed at supporting microfinance growth may also be at the heart of this crisis. Is there a hidden opportunity here to realign policy incentives so that they nurture a sound and healthy path to financial inclusion?
When a story on microfinance appears in major media outlets, the effect on the public image of the sector can be dramatic. That’s why last Friday’s article in the Wall Street Journal, “India’s Major Crisis in Microlending,” requires a response.
The story covers a microfinance crisis in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, triggered by sensationalized newspaper accounts of suicides among over-indebted clients of some of India’s biggest microfinance institutions (MFIs): SKS Microfinance, Spandana, Share, and others. These cases underscore rising debt stress among possibly tens of thousands of clients, brought on by explosive growth of microfinance organizations in southern India. In the quest to meet their growth targets, loan officers often sell loans to clients already indebted to other organizations. The reports offered an opening for the state government, which runs a rival self-help group (SHG) program, to pass a restrictive ordinance severely curtailing the MFIs. The crisis threatens microfinance not only in Andhra Pradesh, but nationwide, as the Reserve Bank of India moves toward removing the priority sector designation that has fueled the sector’s growth (by making it advantageous for banks to lend to MFIs).
The blame for this unfortunate situation falls most squarely on the MFIs that failed to restrain aggressive growth even as the market became increasingly saturated. Investors must also swallow a big spoonful of blame. Becausethey paid dearly for shares in the MFIs, they need fast growth to make their investments pay off.
The divvying up of blame doesn’t stop there, however…Read more >


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November 5, 2010 at 3:41 pm
Whitney Brooks
I work with Ashoka’s Full Economic Citizenship team. Some of our fellows — particularly Root Capital — are addressing structural issues with microfinance through a Hybrid Value Chain model (business and nonprofit structure). The idea is to take finance options for underserved communities to scale so that lending is profitable and sustainable. I’m curious to know if this approach might help resolve some of the problems in India over the long term.
November 8, 2010 at 12:58 pm
Center for Financial Inclusion
Thanks so much for sharing your thoughts. We’d be interested to hear the impressions of professionals working in India. Is the Hybrid Value Chain an approach that works? Thanks for reading and please continue to share your comments. Best regards, Beth Rhyne
November 10, 2010 at 5:24 pm
Whitney Brooks
Beth – Thank you for your interest in the Hybrid Value Chain model. In answer to your first question, an HVC’s impact depends on the degree to which it draws on core competencies of partners. Sustainability of a hybrid model hinges on scale, and thus requires that the partners have complementary assets and goals. The Housing for All program in India has had much success so far in bringing together businesses, citizen sector organizations and financial institutions to develop affordable housing. 1,800 new homes were purchased by low income families during the first 9 months of 2010. I encourage everyone to read more at http://fec.ashoka.org/content/housing-all-india.
November 11, 2010 at 5:16 am
Veena Mankar
I would like to add a dimension to Beth Rhyne’s perspective on “Whose to blame for the AP crisis?” The two main contentious issues in the AP crisis are the unaffordable interest rate and collection practices, which have led to a comparison with the notorious money lender. To my mind, both these issues, to a certain degree, trace their roots to the lack of comprehensive financial services for the poor.
MFIs have successfully reached loans to the poor, but not other financial services. It is accepted that the poor have entrepreneur opportunities that provide returns of 20-30% per month and which can therefore absorb the very high interest rates on loans, arising from high transactional costs. However, the interest rate becomes unaffordable when the loan is used, not for income generation or cash flow smoothening , but other purposes. With easy access to credit, loans are being used by low income households as substitutes for other financial products. In a situation without life or accident insurance for the main income earner, a loan is taken to tide over the “emergency” from death or disability. So is the case in a medical “emergency” requiring hospitalisation of a family member. In the absence of planning and saving for life cycle events such as birth, marriage and education, loans become surrogate savings and an alternative for insurance products that the middle class can access. Poor women in the slums of Mumbai have said to me again and again that they are often compelled to resort to borrowings to tide over “emergencies”.
A 98 or 99% repayment record to MFIs has been celebrated as evidence of the credit worthiness of the poor. In doing so, have MFIs become a victim of their own success? By accepting this as the underlying premise , restructuring and delinquency management were considered to be unnecessary. Having these in place would only increase operational costs, which in turn would further push up interest rates or affect sustainability.
In reality, when field officers are faced with non-payment, and don’t know what to do, they resort to whatever methods they consider work. The industry needs to strongly introspect if even in a small minority of cases, in the absence of proper direction, the village money lender’s method has become the role model for collection . In any lending business, dealing with non payment has to be part of the policy and process, and not left to the discretion of the person on the spot.
Had the loans not been used for emergencies, the repayment would not have become a problem. The emergency, however, was not caused by the MFI – but by poverty, vulnerability and lack of other financial products. The MFI loans, at a much lower rate than the moneylender, probably gave some more staying power to the family.
To address the present crisis, the government and regulator need to introspect as much, if not more, than the MFIs. What is needed is an acceptance that MFIs can reach where others have failed, creating an enabling environment permitting MFIs to deliver, but deliver with responsibility, more than just loans.
November 14, 2010 at 10:56 pm
Rajan Alexander
For Micro-Finance survival, they need to muzzle their Spin Doctors and listen more to their High Priest
A string of suicides in Andhra Pradesh that put micro-finance under the spotlight, triggered a backlash because of which, MFIs found themselves reduced to fighting for their basic survival. No surprise here to find a variety of spin-doctors functioning as their apologists, fending off and neutralising any criticism that the industry faces currently, almost oblivion to the fact their support is to a slow sinking Titanic. Two of the most significant spins in this debate are those related to suicides and interest rate. In this post, we bust these spins.
“I believe in Schumpeterian creative destruction. Its time has come. The present MFI model has to go…. It wasn’t just about giving loans. It was also about creating livelihood mechanisms, which would build capacity among the poor to repay their loans easily, and leave them better off than before”
This is Economic Times quoting Vijay Mahajan, considered the high priest of Indian microfinance suggesting that either MFIs change their business models or go bust.
Read more: http://devconsultgroup.blogspot.com/2010/11/for-micro-finance-survival-they-need-to.html
November 23, 2010 at 4:31 pm
Swadhaar Co-founder Veena Mankar Chimes In on the Andhra Pradesh Discussion «
[…] I would like to add a dimension to Beth Rhyne’s perspective on “Who’s to blame for the Andhra Pradesh crisis?“ […]